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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an Order Granting Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff
entered by the District Court of Weber County, Ogden Department, State of Utah,
transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In determining a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, when matters outside the pleading are presented, is the trial
court at liberty to limit its consideration of the matters presented outside the pleadings to
those presented by the defendant and to decide the motion in manner other than the
manner prescribed by said Rule?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly'"
(CJA, Chapter 12, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(8)).
(1) Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
'Tf, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a
motion by Rule 56." (Utah RCiv.P. 12(b)(6))
(2) Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Utah R Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment,
this court considers "all of the facts and evidence presented, and every
reasonable inference arising therefrom, in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion." Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 408
(Utah App. 1987). Further, because summary judgment presents only
questions of law, this court accords no deference to the trial court's ruling
Appellant's Brief
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and reviews it for correctness. Estate of Covington v. Josephson^ 888 P. 2d
675 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994).
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW

Canon 3B(8) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct provides that

wC

[a] judge shall

dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly'' (CJA, Chapter 12, Code
of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(8)). In accordance with the terminology section of said
Code, '"[s]hair and 'shall not' impose binding obligations to respectively engage in or
refrain from the described conduct." This appeal is based on the trial judge's failure to
dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly in this case.
There is no record of Stan Nielsen objecting to the exhibits in support of motion
to dismiss (Record, pages 133-164) because those exhibits were made relevant by the
second amended complaint filed on October 15, 2000 (Record, pages 170-176). On
January 31, 2000, the trial judge disallowed the amended complaint (Record, page 261)
and in doing so, rendered the exhibits in support of motion to dismiss (Record, pages
133-164) irrelevant.
Stan Nielsen objected

wC

to the Court giving any consideration to any statement

made by the attorney representing Curtis Petersen that [was] not supported by an affidavit
or other relevant document before the Court. Every contention of fact made during the
defense counsel's argument [fell] within the scope of [that] objection." (Record, pages
179-180).
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RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Chapter 12
Canon 3(BX8)
"A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required,
except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be
made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack
of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. (7) failure to join an indispensable party.
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a
further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion
or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment
in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
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(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
5fe #

#

(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501. Motions.
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page
number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents
relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a
motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of
material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of
the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file
an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the
principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in excess often pages,
the application shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to
exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
Appellant's Brief
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documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
# # #

(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends
no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section
that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party
contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs
(3)(b)or(4)below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the
time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to
a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or
set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided.
Appellant's Brief
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Two causes of action comprise this case. The first is a breach of contract claim
that arose in 1997 seeking damag es in the amount of $1,430,011.33 (Record, pages 1617). The second is a malicious prosecution claim that matured in July, 1999, seeking
judgment against the defendants in the amount of $24,500 (Record, page 174). Stan
Nielsen filed the original complaint on January 19, 1999 (Record, pages 1-12), and filed
an amended complaint on February 26, 1999 (Record, pages 14-25).
On March 1, 1999, Curtis Petersen, one of the defendants (Record, page 1), filed a
'"Hearing Requested-Motion to Dismiss and/or in the Alternative Motion for More
Definite Statement & Sanctions" (Record, pages 26-31). Neither a memorandum nor an
affidavit was filed in support of Curtis Petersen's motion, however, four documents from
an Idaho court were attached to the motion (Record, pages 32-58). On August 11, 1999,
Curtis Petersen filed a request to submit for decision (Record, pages 59-60).
On August 23, 1999, Stan Nielsen filed a motion for summary judgment (Record,
pages 63-64), a memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment (Record,
pages 69-71), an affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment (Record, pages
72-75) with supporting documents attached (Record, pages 76-88), and a memorandum
in opposition to Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss (Record, pages 89-92).
On August 26, 1999, Curtis Petersen filed a "Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment and in Support of Motion to Dismiss" (Record, pages 93-104)
together with the affidavit of Philip C. Patterson (105-106). Stan Nielsen filed a reply
memorandum on September 2, 1999 (Record, pages 109-117).

Appellant's Brief
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On October 12, 1999, Curtis Peterson filed exhibits in support of motion to
dismiss (Record, pages 133-164).

On October 13, 1999, Curtis Petersen filed the

Affidavit of F. Randall Kline (Record, pages 165-168).
On October 14, 1999, the trial court held a hearing ccby profer" (sic). (Record
page 169).
On October 28, 1999, Stan Nielsen filed a memorandum in response to matters
and documents raised in oral argument on the motion to dismiss (Record, pages 179187).
On November 19, 1999, Robert L. Petersen filed an answer '"to plaintiffs
complaint and/or amended complaint...'' (Record, page 235).
On December 14, 1999, Robert L. Petersen and Curtis Petersen filed a
"supplemental answer" (R. pages 259-260).
On January 31, 2000, the trial judge disallowed the filing of the amended
complaint that had been filed on October 15, 2000, and entered a Ruling granting Curtis
Petersen's motion to dismiss and denying Stan Nielsen's motion for summary judgment.
On February 25, 2000, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment
against the plaintiff.
On March 24, 2000, Stan Nielsen filed his notice of appeal (Record, pages 270272).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court did not dispose of Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss promptly,
efficiently, and fairly.

Appellant's Brief
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a. Promptly is interpreted to mean on time or punctual. Having a motion
to dismiss under advisement for 109 days is not prompt disposal of the matter.
b. Efficiently is interpreted to mean with a minimum of waste, expense, or
unnecessary effort.

Holding a hearing by proffer was a waste of time that

resulted. Disallowing an amendment of the complaint 108 days after it was filed
resulted in waste, and ignoring the issues framed by the pleadings and the motion
to dismiss resulted in unnecessary efforts for the trial judge and the parties.
c. Fairly is interpreted to mean consistent with rules, logic or ethics. The
trial judge did not decide Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss in accordance with
the rules that govern such a motion when matters outside the record are presented.
The motion was not accompanied by an memorandum and it was not supported
by aflBdavits or other supporting evidence, When the trial judged substituted
pleadings and proof with proffers, promptness, efficiency, and fairness were
forfeited.
d. It was unfair (not in accordance with the rules) for the trial judge to rely
exclusively on matters other than the pleadings and affidavits in disposing of
Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss. Utah R-Civ.P. 56(c) limits what the court
can consider to the pleadings and affidavits properly before it. In this case, the
trial judge relied on everything except the pleadings and affidavits.
e. The trial judge substituted proffers for pleading and proof, thereby
forfeiting promptness, efficiency, and fairness.

He compromised his judicial

responsibilities by making himself and advocate for the defense. His findings of
fact are not supported by the record.
Appellant' s Brief
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT DISPOSE OF CURTIS PETERSEN'S MOTION
TO DISMISS PROMPTLY, EFFICIENTLY, AND FAIRLY.
a. The trial judge did not dispose of Curtis
Petersen's motion to dismiss promptly.
Promptly" is interpreted to mean "[°] n time, punctual,'' American Heritage

Publishing Co.,

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,

(1971).
The trial judge decided Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss on January 31, 2000,
109 days after the hearing on the motion (Record, page 261). CJA Rule 3-104(3)(L)
suggests that any case or issue held by a judge for more than 60 days has not been
decided promptly. Disallowing an amended complaint that was filed without leave of the
court to remain filed for 108 days was neither prompt nor efficient.
b. The trial judge did not dispose of Curtis
Petersen's motion to dismiss efficiently.
'Efficiently" is interpreted to mean "[w]ith a minimum of waste, expense, or
unnecessary effort..." American Heritage Publishing Co., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (1971).

On October 14, 2000, the trial court held a hearing ccby profer" (sic) (Record, page
169). Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c) permits entry of summary' judgment only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Nothing permits the court to
enter summary judgment on the basis of proffers instead of affidavits that conform to the
requirements of Utah KCiv.P. 56(e) and for that reason, holding a hearing by proffer is
Appellant's Brief
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wasteful. As hereinafter discussed in greater detail, the waste was compounded when the
trial judge considered evidence not relevant to any of the issues raised by Curtis
Petersen's motion to dismiss (Record, pages 261-266).
c. The trial judge did not dispose of Curtis Petersen's
motion to dismiss fairly,
^Fairly" is interpreted to mean "[consistent with rules, logic, or ethics,"
American Heritage Publishing Co., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE,

(1971). The rules governing the disposal of the motion to dismiss

brought by Curtis Petersen are unambiguous.
Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss was based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure (Record page 26). Four documents were annexed to the motion
(Record, pages 28, 32-58). Rule 12(b) provides in pertinent part that:
I£ on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
CJA 4-501 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page
Appellant's Brief
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number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents
relied upon in support of the motion.
#

*

5}J

(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends
no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the movant relies.
Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss was not "accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities, appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number
to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of
the motion" as required by CJA 4-501(l)(a). There being no memorandum, there was no
"section that [contained] a concise statement of material facts as to which [defendants
contended] no genuine issue [existed]" as required by CJA 4-501(2)(a). There being no
affidavit(s), the motion was not supported as required by Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e).
When Curtis Petersen filed a request to submit for decision (Record, pages 5960), the trial judges obligation to dispose of the motion promptly, efficiently, and fairly
dictated dismissal of the motion because the motion had not been made and supported as
provided in the above-quoted rules.
Two days before the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Curtis Petersen filed 2
exhibits in support of his motion to dismiss (Record, pages 133-164). The day before the
hearing, Curtis Petersen filed the Affidavit of F. Randall Kline (Record, pages 165-168).
There is nothing in the record indicating that Stan Nielsen was provided with a copy of
the Affidavit of F. Randall Kline prior to the hearing, hi any event, following the hearing

Appellant's Bnef
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"by proffer," Stan Nielsen filed an amended complaint (Record, 170-176) so as to define
the issues arising from the 2 exhibits filed two days earlier (Record, pages 133-164). The
facts evidenced by those exhibits were not relevant to any issue of fact raised by Curtis
Petersen's motion to dismiss. When the trial judge decided to disallow the amended
complaint 108 days after the amended complaint was filed, fairness and Utah Rule of
Evidence 402 (evidence that is not relevent is not admissible) dictated that the trial judge
also disallow the exhibits that had also been filed without leave of the court.
d. The trial judge relied exclusively on matters other than the pleadings
and affidavits in disposing of Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss.
Rule 56(c) provides that after a motion for summary judgment has been 'filed and
served in accordance with CJA 4-501 ... [t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The pleadings gave rise to
the following issues of fact:
1. Defendants are the owners of certain real property hereinafter referred
to as the Petersen Farm.
2. On October 22, 1986, an Order Approving Transfer of Property7 was
entered by United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah Central
Division, Bankruptcy No. 86 00700, whereby a contract purchase interest
in the Petersen Farm was converted to an irrevocable option to purchase
the Petersen Farm. A copy of said Order is attached hereto as Attachment
1 and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. A copy of the option is
attached hereto as Attachment 2 and incorporated herein as if set forth in
full.
3. Plaintiff is a resident of Weber County, Utah, and the owner of the
irrevocable option to purchase the Petersen Farm.
4. The individually named Defendants are residents of the State of Utah,
and the partnerships named as defendants are Utah partnerships. The
Appellant's Brief
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Defendants are the grantors of the option and successors in interest to the
original grantors of the option. (Record, page 15).
5. When the option was bargained, sold, and granted by the Defendants,
Defendants were to receive Conservation Reserve Program ("CRP")
payments for ten years as consideration for the option.
6. Beginning in October 1987, Defendants received annual CRP payments,
each in the amount of $73,508.00.
7. In 1996, Defendants negotiated a new CRP contract that provided for
ten more annual CRP payments, each in the amount of $56,764.00.
8. On December 30, 1996, notice of Plaintiffs acceptance of their
irrevocable offer to sell the Farm was mailed to the Defendants.
9. On January 9, 1997, defendants responded to plaintiffs acceptance of
their irrevocable offer with a contention that their irrevocable offer had
been revoked.
# # #

11. Plaintiff's acceptance of the defendants' irrevocable offer to sell the
Farm created a bilateral contract for the sale of the farm between the
plaintiff and the defendants.
12. Defendants7 breached the contract by refusing to perform their
obligations under the terms of the option contract.
13. When the Defendants' breached the contract, the Farm had an
investment value of $1,637,285.08.
14. As a direct and proximate consequence of defendants' breach of
contract, plaintiff has suffered damages as follows:
a. In January of 1997, plaintiff lost the net investment market value
(investment market value - option cost) of the Farm; and
b. In October of 1997 and again in October of 1998, plaintiff lost
income in the amount of $56,764. (Record, pages 15-16).
The defendant's answer asserts no affirmative defenses (Record, page 259).
Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss was based on the following legal theories and
contentions of fact:

Appellant's Brief
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(1) To be enforceable, any agreement that deals with an interest in land
must be in writing and signed by the person to be charged. The agreement alleged
in this case is not signed by Curtis Petersen (Record, page 27).
(2) 'The claim of the plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of res adjudica or
prior adjudication and/or collateral estoppel in that the claims made in the instant
case were similarly raised and fully litigated by the parties in ... [Onieda County,
Idaho] Civil Case No. 7-874 . . . wherein the issues were all resolved in the favor
of plaintiffs and against defendants...." (Record, page 27).
The Ruling made by the trial judge did not address the remaining contentions on which
Curtis Petersen based his motion to dismiss.
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e) makes it clear that "c[w]hen a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial." As discussed above, Curtis Petersen's motion was not made and supported as
provided in Utah KCiv.P. 56. Therefore, Stan Nielsen was not obligated by the rule to
respond. However, Stan Nielsen did respond by affidavit (Record, pages 72-88). A
certified copy of a court document evidencing that Curtis Petersen is an owner of the
property7 is attached thereto (Record, page 79). Viewing that evidence in a light most
favorable to Stan Nielsen, as the trial judge claims he did (Record, page 263), there is a
genuine issue as to privity, and summary judgment was inappropriate.
Further, the evidence that Curtis Petersen did not sign the agreement giving rise
to the option is not evidence "... having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
Appellanf s Brief
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that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence'1 (URE 401). In this case, the evidence that Curtis
Petersen did not sign the agreement is not evidence having any tendency to make the
allegations that Curtis Petersen is one of the owners of the farm and a successor in
interest to the grantors more or less probable than those allegations would be without the
evidence. As the evidence does not fall within the scope of '"relevant evidence" defined
by Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the fact evidenced thereby is not a material
fact that shows the Curtis Petersen is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Curtis Petersen also contended that wT:he claims made in the instant case were
similarly raised and fully litigated by the parties in ... [Onieda County, Idaho] Civil Case
No. 7-874 . . . wherein the issues were all resolved in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants Nielsen." (Record, page 27). There is nothing in the record that shows
that the claims made paragraphs 1-6 of the complaint in the instant case (Record, pages
14-15) were similarly raised and fully litigated by the parties in that case, and that the
plaintiffs in that case prevailed on those claims. The claims asserted in paragraphs 7-14
of the complaint in this case (Record, pages 15-16) could not have been "similarly raised
and folly litigated by the parties in Civil Case No. 7-874" (Record, page 27) because
those claims did not mature before the ten annual CRP payments totaling $735,080 had
been received and the original ten-year CRP contract had been terminated (Record, page
22). Because the breach of contract claim made in this case did not mature until January
of 1997, the claim could not have been brought in Civil Case No. 7-874 and res judicata
does not apply.

Appellant's Brief

Page 15

e. The trial judge substituted proffers for pleadings and proof,
thereby forfeiting promptness, efficiency, and fairness.
By ignoring the issues raised by Curtis Petersen in his motion to dismiss and
Curtis Petersen's waiver of all affirmative defenses, including res judicata, the trial judge
compromised his judicial responsibilities by making himself an advocate for the defense.
That was the role assumed when the trial judge invented a res judicata defense to the
malicious prosecution claim (Record, page 265) and, without giving Stan Nielsen notice
of said defense and an opportunity to respond to it, the trial judge granted summary
judgment against Stan Nielsen because he *'[failed] to propose any valid justification why
the doctrine of res judicata would not [bar] his malicious prosecution claim. Further,
there is nothing in the record that supports the trial judge's finding that "[t]he issue of any
impropriety with the slander suit have already been dealt with by a foreign court...."
(Record, page 265).
He also assumed the role of advocate for the defense with regard to the breach of
contract claim. Curtis Petersen and Robert L. Petersen waived all affirmative defenses
(Record, page 259, Utah RCiv.P. 8(c)). The trial judge ignored their waiver and took
109 days creating affirmative defenses on their behalf. In doing so, he breached his
obligation to dispose of the judicial matter before him promptly, efficiently, and fairly.
(CJA, Chapter 12, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(8)).
The record does not support the affirmative defenses he created. Specifically:
(1) There is nothing in the record that supports the trial judge's finding
that the claim that an option for which $735,080 was paid as consideration is
irrevocable (Record, p. 15) was fully and fairly litigated in a prior case between
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the parties in this case and decided in Curtis Petersen's favor (Record, page 264);
and
(2) There is nothing in the record that supports the trial judge's finding
that the claim that an Order Approving Transfer of Property was entered by the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah Central Division whereby
a contract purchase interest in the Petersen Farm was converted to an irrevocable
interest to purchase the Petersen Farm (Record, page 15) was folly and fairly
litigated in a prior case between the parties in this case and decided in Curtis
Petersen's favor (Record, page 264).
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Order Granting Summary Judgment Against the Plaintiff
should be set aside and this case should be remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings.
Dated this 2nd day of November, 2000

DaniefL.
CERTIFIC
I certify that on this 2nd day of November, 2000, a copy of the foregoing
document was mailed, postage prepaid, to each of the following:
David J. Knowlton
Attorney at Law
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary.
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